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tion may properly bear on the question of whether a third person
may enforce this kind of provision as beneficiary of a stipulation
pour autrui, but it should not be controlling in determining
whether the restriction constitutes a real obligation to which
the land is subjected.
The question of the continued effectiveness of a general
scheme or plan of land development despite some violations of
the restrictions imposed was considered carefully and at length
by the court in Guyton v. Yancey. 2 It was found that the plan
as conceived and established by the subdividers had not been
abandoned or discarded and continued to be legally effective.
The court also found that an imperceptible violation by the plain-
tiff himself of the front set-back requirements did not debar
him from complaining of the threatened flagrant violation by
the defendant. The case represents a realistic application of the
controlling principles.
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
Widow's Homestead Privilege
Privileges are a form of security device in Louisiana law
and when they affect immovable property there is a close resem-
blance to mortgage. For mortgages, there is an inexorable rule
that there must be proper recordation in order to affect third
persons. For privileges which affect immovables, the same is
generally true, but there are some exceptions.' In the case of
such an exception, the privilege attaches to the property just
as if it had been recorded, and the lack of recordation does not
abbreviate or limit the scope of the effectiveness of the privilege,
even as against third persons. At this time, there is no question
of sympathy for the property owners who have so many other
burdens, or the title examiners who already have a fantastic
job in comparison to the simple checking of titles under a Tor-
rens system type of recordation. Neither is this the time for
sympathy to the patient funeral director, the devoted doctor,
or the necessitous widow. These policy considerations were all
2. 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1961).
1. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19 (1921) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3276 (1870).
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taken into account in the formulation of Article XIX, Section 19,
of the Constitution and Article 3276 of the Civil Code. Never-
theless, the so-called "public records" doctrine has taken such
a strong hold on the minds of the legal profession that, with the
aid of a little wishful thinking and a lot of legal pyro-techniques,
there develops a blind spot which refuses to see the established
exceptions.
The case of Washington v. Washington,2 with its several
trials and a Supreme Court rehearing, reflects some of the fore-
going difficulties and finally came out with what appears to
be the correct conclusion, although there were many diverse con-
tentions and opinions formulated in the total process.
The necessitous widow's claim and privilege for $1,000,
together with the conditions governing its ranking, are set forth
in Civil Code Article 3252; and it affects immovable as well as
movable property. Article XIX, Section 19, of the Constitution
and Article 3276 of the Civil Code specifically except this privi-
lege from the recordation requirement. In the presence of the
contemplated circumstances, the privilege comes into existence
at the time of the husband's death.
If there were a recorded mortgage or vendor's privilege
against this property at the time of the husband's death, there
would be no question about such a mortgage or privilege being
effective against the property even if it were conveyed in the
succession settlement to a third person. Why then should there
be so much resistance to the idea of the widow's homestead
privilege being similarily effective? If this privilege had been
recorded, there would of course be no objection; but since this
privilege is excepted from the requirement of recordation it is
just as effective as if it had the same benefits which recordation
gives to those privileges and mortgages which do need it.
This is the conclusion reached by the majority of the Su-
preme Court on rehearing, despite the opposite position taken
on the first hearing and the ingenious contentions to the con-
trary.
In addition to the foregoing issue about recordation, the
principal contention against recognition of the widow's home-
stead privilege was the three-months prescription for a suit of
2. 241 La. 35, 127 So.2d 491 (1961) ; 116 So.2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
For comments about utilization of Planiol references, see Dainow, The Planiol
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separation of patrimony.3 When the widow obtained judgment
on her original claim for the $1,000 homestead, no appeal was
taken; but when she sought to enforce this judgment and re-
quested recognition of the privilege, the argument was made
that the privilege was lost by this three-months prescription
because of her failure to pray for recognition of the privilege
in the original suit.
This contention is predicated on the assimilation of the
widow's homestead claim to the claims of the husband's creditors
who can be kept out of the heir's personal property by the heir's
suit for separation of patrimony. Much argument was developed
to parallel the (questionable?) equity and justice of keeping the
widow out of the property belonging to the husband's heirs.
However, in the first place, the prescription of the action for
separation of patrimony is something which works against the
heirs and not against the decedent's creditors. Secondly, the
widow's homestead claim has no resemblance to the heir's right
to demand separation of patrimony. Thirdly, neither reason nor
justice can provide a prescription in direct contradiction to
Civil Code Article 3470 which provides: "There are no other
prescriptions than those established by this Code and by the
statutes of this State now in force." Finally, just as there is
no specific prescription for the widow's homestead claim (thus
leaving it subject to the omnibus provision of ten years for
personal actions ) 4 neither is there any for the accessory privilege
which accompanies the claim.
Building Contract Privileges
The private building contract law5 provides two kinds of
protection for a great many different creditors whose services
or supplies contributed to the construction or repair of a build-
ing. One security device is the lien or privilege against the
property, the other is the surety bond which the contractor
should put up. Sometimes there is also the personal liability
of the property owner to make good for the contractor's short-
comings.6 However, this does not mean that all the creditors
Treatise on the Civil Law: French and Louisiana Law for Comparative Study,
10 Am. J. CoMP. L. 175, 182-184 (1961).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1456 (1870).
4. Id. art. 3544.
5. LA. R.S. 9:4801 et seq. (1950).
6. Id. 9:4806, 4812.
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of the contractor are always protected for what has been con-
tributed to the accomplishment of the project. It must be re-
membered that the subject of privileges is an area of exception 7
and the rule of very strict interpretation is required by law.8
In the case of National Surety Corp. v. Highland Park Coun-
try Club, Inc.,9 the creditor claiming a privilege and seeking
participation in the fund of the surety's concursus proceeding
was the lessor of equipment which had been rented to the con-
tractor. There is no question that the use of this machinery
and equipment contributed to the construction project, nor was
there any issue about the contractor's indebtedness for the un-
paid rentals. In enumerating the creditors protected by the
building contract law,10 the statute includes the "furnisher of...
machinery.., who performs work" and by a strict construction
of this text, the Supreme Court was impelled to deny both the
privilege and the participation in the surety's fund on the basis
that the creditor who rented equipment without performing any
work was not covered by the statute.
When there is doubt or dispute concerning the meaning or
scope of a statute, the matter is for judicial interpretation and
decision. In the present case, the Supreme Court has given its
answer; and in the light of the governing rule of stricti juris,
its decision can be supported.
In a less strict interpretation of the statute, the court of
appeal" considered that "furnishers of machinery" included not
only the supplier who sold machinery which actually went into
the construction and the vendor of necessary tools for the work-
men, but also the lessor of machinery which was used for neces-
sary operations of the construction. This interpretation found
some support by analogy in the statute providing protection
(privileges and surety bond) for creditors who have contributed
to a mineral development project.12 Nevertheless, on this point,
the Supreme Court had to say that the two statutes are not
in pari materia but are distinguishable. 3 Furthermore, in an
7. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3183-3184 (1870) ; Dainow, Privileges in Louisiana
Law, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 537 (1953).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3185 (1870).
9. 240 La. 747, 125 So.2d 151 (1960).
10. LA. R.S. 9:4801 (1950).
11. 111 So.2d 811 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959).
12. LA. R.S. 9:4861 (1950).
13. 125 So.2d at 154.
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area of law which is stricti juris like privileges, there is no room
to make any concessions.
As a question of getting at legislative intent or as a matter
of re-examining policy considerations on the issue of the prin-
cipal case, there is room for a different point of view. The
current Civil Code provision 14 and all its antecedents to 180815
gave the protection of a privilege to those who did direct work
or who supplied materials for a construction or repair job.
Planiol refers to this privilege as coming from the old French
law with even older Roman origins, and he gives as the reason
for the privilege that the creditor has contributed something to
the patrimony of another.8 Since 1916, the Louisiana statutes
have superseded the Code provisions, and with the increasingly
complex operations involved in modern construction and repair
work, the scope of the statutory protection has been expanded
to include more categories of protected creditors and secured
claims for necessary services and supplies which contributed to
the accomplishment of the job.
In the drafting of the current statute, there was probably
no thought given specifically to the lessor of machinery who
performs no work. Since this area of the law must remain one
of stricti juris, the only proper answer is one of legislative con-
sideration. In this process, it might well be an improvement
toward clarification if the category of those who contribute
services be treated separately from the category of those who
furnish supplies, instead of having two complicated subject
elements and two separate verb phrases in one clause of a much
longer sentence which in turn incorporates a variety of other
similar but not the same enumerations.
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
Acquisitive Prescription (Ten-Year)
The case of Boyet v. Perryman' raises several points of in-
14. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3249(2, 3) (1870).
15. Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, under Art. 3249.
16. 2 PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW no. 2913 et seq. (Eng. transl.
1959).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 240 La. 339, 123 So.2d 79 (1960), reversing 98 So.2d 593 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1957).
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